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INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF THE CLAUSE "ARISING OUT OF THE
USE OF" IN AN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY-
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642, 139 N.W.
2d 821 (1966).
National Union Fire Insurance Company brought an action for
declaratory judgment to determine whether they were legally ob-
ligated to defend their insured, Scott Campbell, under the terms
of a comprehensive insurance policy. Scott Campbell was hunting
with some companions, and while returning home in an automobile
attempted to unload his rifle. In the process the rifle discharged
causing serious injury to the driver. In the suit that followed,
three insurance companies became involved,' as well as Scott Camp-
bell, a minor, and his father. The primary issue at the trial was
whether the injury arose out of the "use of the automobile" as de-
fined in the automobile policy. The trial judge held that the injury
did so arise. On appeal the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed
holding that some causal relationship must exist between the use
of the automobile and the injury to the victim before the accident
can "arise out of the use of the automobile." Since no such rela-
tionship existed, the automobile insurer was under no duty to de-
fend.
This decision was the first in Nebraska construing the clause
"arising out of the use of" an automobile. Although there has been
general agreement as to the definition of this clause in other juris-
dictions,2 a problem arises in its application. 3 The purpose of this
note will be to discuss the application of the particular facts of
this case to the definition of the clause, to compare this decision to
other decisions in the area, and to formulate some guide lines which
will aid in future application of the clause.
1 National Union Fire insured the Campbeils under a comprehensive per-
sonal liability policy. Allstate insured Joseph Bruecks, Sr., and his
family, including persons using the automobile with his consent, under
an automobile liability policy covering the car which his son was
driving at the time of the shooting. St. Paul insured the Campbells on
an automobile owned by them, which extended coverage for the use of
non-owned automobiles.
2 See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Lott, 273 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1960); Federated
Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Gupton, 241 F. Supp. 509
(E.D.S.C. 1965); Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co.,
403 Pa. 603, 170 A.2d 571 (1961); Suburban Serv. Bus Co. v. National
Mut. Cas. Co., 237 Mo. App. 1128, 183 S.W.2d 376 (1944); Schmidt v.
Utilities Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d 181 (1944).
3 See Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Gupton, 241 F.
Supp. 509, 511 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 150, 153 (1963).
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I. DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OF THE "ARISING OUT
OF THE USE OF" CLAUSE
It has been generally held that insurance contracts will be
construed liberally in favor of the insured, and when they are sus-
ceptible of two interpretations, the one that favors the insured
will be preferred.4 Accordingly, the clause "arising out of the use
of" has been interpreted to mean causally connected with, not
proximately caused by the automobile. 5 Furthermore, the words
"arising out of" are of broader significance than the words "caused
by," and are ordinarily understood to mean originating from, inci-
dent to, or having connection with the use of the vehicle.6
The problem of applying the "arising out of the use of" clause
resolves itself into two parts: first, was Scott Campbell using the
automobile within the terms of the policy, and second, did the in-
juries sustained by the plaintiff arise out of that use?
A person need not be the operator or driver of a vehicle to be
using it within the meaning of the policy. A person is using the
automobile if he is a passenger in the vehicle with the permission
7
of the named insured." The court, in the instant case, found that
4 Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 403 Pa. 603, 170
A.2d 571 (1961); Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d
181 (1944); Soukop v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 341 Mo. 614, 108
S.W.2d 86 (1937).
5 Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 403 Pa. 603, 170
A.2d 571 (1961).
6 Red Ball Motor Freight v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 189 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1951); 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 4317
(1962).
The Nebraska Supreme Court in the National decision cited Schmidt
v. Utilities Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d 181 (1944) which said
"[t]he words 'arising out of the use' are very broad, general, and
comprehensive terms, and are ordinarily understood to mean origi-
nating from, growing out of, or flowing from." National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642, 649, 139 N.W.2d 821, 826 (1966).
7 Often there is a question raised as to what is permission within the
meaning of the policy. For a discussion see Comment, 44 NFX. L. REV.
129 (1965).
8 See Metcalf v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d 471
(1964); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 52 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Ill.
1943) where the court citing Brown v. Kennedy, 38 Ohio L. Abs. 134,
138, 49 N.E.2d 417, 419, (Ohio Ct. App. 1942) said: "Certainly, it would
be a narrower application of the term used, ignoring the general
considerations mentioned, to require one using the car to use it in its
entirety. The daughter of the insured was using the seat, which she
occupied. She was using the sides and top to shelter her from the
weather. She was using the wheels and tires, for upon them she was
propelled through space. She was using the motor of the car, for by
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Scott Campbell was riding as a passenger in the insured vehicle
with the permission of the named insured, since the driver's mother,
who was a named insured, directed the driver to pick up the
youths. 9 However, extending liability coverage to a passenger as
an insured does not necessarily mean that every negligent act com-
mitted by the passenger in which someone is injured "arises out of
the use" of the automobile. There must be some causal connec-
tion between the injury and the use of the vehicle. 10 The difficulty
therefore centers around the determination of whether the facts in
each peculiar case are sufficient to sustain the required causal
relationship."
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES CAUSAL CONNECTION
The Nebraska Supreme Court held in the National case that the
discharge of the gun during the use of the automobile was not
within the coverage of the "arising out of the use" clause. 12 How-
ever, considering the public policy of liberal construction in favor of
the insured and considering the fact that the insurance company has
the power to limit any risk that they do not wish to cover, it would
seem that the narrower application that the Nebraska Supreme
Court placed upon the clause is unwarranted. There are decisions
from other jurisdictions which the court cites with approval, but
then attempts to distinguish, which afford a broader base upon
which liability may be found. These cases illustrate several factors
or tests used in construing the clause and each test will be dis-
cussed separately.
A. FACILITATING THE USE OF THE VEHICLE
In Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 13 plaintiff was injured when he
its power the vehicle in which she was riding was propelled along the
road. Is all of this use to be ignored, simply because she did not hold
the wheel-manipulate the gear shift, press the accelerator or brake
pedal? Manifestly, this is restricting the full reasonable words, which
the insured has written." Id. at 603. See also Hardware Mut. Cas. Co.
v. Mitnick, 180 Md. 604, 26 A.2d 393 (1942); Comment, 44 NEB. L. REV.
129, 138-39 (1965).
9 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642, 647-48, 139 N.W.
2d 821, 824 (1966).
10 See 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4317 (1963); Annot.,
89 A.L.R.2d 150, 153 (1963). Cf. Federal Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut.
Liab. Co., 277 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1960).
11 See Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Gupton, 241 F.
Supp. 509, 511 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
12 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642, 139 N.W.2d 821
(1966).
13 353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d 181 (1944).
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tripped and fell over some wooden blocks located on the sidewalk.
The driver of a truck had left the blocks on the sidewalk after he
had used them as ramps for the purpose of backing the truck over
the curb. The court held that the use of the blocks was necessary
to facilitate the use of the truck; therefore the clause applied. In
the National case, the transportation of the rifles facilitated the use
of the vehicle since the vehicle was being used for the pleasure of
the passengers by transporting them and their equipment home
from a hunting trip. The transportation of the rifles was a neces-
sary act in the fulfillment of the trip.
B. INCIDENT TO THE USE OF THE VEHCLE
In Suburban Serv. Bus Co. v. National Mut. Cas. Co., 14 a child
was injured as a result of being struck by some fluid from a
fire extinguisher, which the bus driver discharged at the passen-
gers to frighten them into refraining from using water guns on
him. The court said that the injury arose out of the use of the bus
since the bus driver's conduct was for the promotion of the safe
operation of the bus and consequently incident to its use in trans-
porting passengers. In the same manner, the unloading of the rifle
in the National case was to prepare it for safe transportation in the
vehicle and therefore any injury arising from this preparation was
incident to the use of the vehicle.
14 237 Mo. App. 1128, 183 S.W.2d 376 (1944). See Roche v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 247 App. Div. 335, 287 N.Y.S. 38 (2d Dep't 1936),
affd 273 N.Y. 473, 6 N.E.2d 410 (1936) where an insured was walking
toward a gas tank with a lighted cigarette in his mouth and a lighted
match in his hand to examine the dial of a gauge on the vehicle. There
was an explosion and the plaintiff was injured. The court said that
the examination of the dial was incidental to the use of the vehicle;
consequently the injury arose out of the use of the vehicle. See also
Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 189 F.2d
374 (5th Cir. 1951) where an employee was negligent in failing to close
a valve after refueling a truck. The failure to close the valve resulted
in an overflow of gasoline which exploded after the truck had departed.
The court said that the act of the driver was incident to the use of the
truck, and therefore the injury arose out of the use of the truck. But
cf. Esfeld Trucking, Inc. v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 193 Kan. 7, 392 P.2d
107 (1964) where a truck had been unloaded at the job site and was
being towed by a winch when the truck struck and injured a geologist.
The court held that the injury did not arise out of the use of the truck
because the injury was not a natural and reasonable incident or conse-
quence of the use of the vehicle.
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C. CONTEMPLATED BY THE PARTIES
In American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,' 5 an automobile
was towing a jeep and was involved in a collision which resulted in
injuries to the plaintiff. The court held that the manner in which
the jeep was being used was not too unusual, and that it was
clearly within the contemplation of the parties to the insurance
contract. Accordingly, the injury arose out of the use of the auto-
mobile. The vehicle in National was being used as a means to con-
vey boys and their rifles home from a hunting trip. This use is not
unusual and could reasonably be considered within the contem-
plation of the parties.
D. "BUT FOR" CAUSATION
In Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co.,16 a
pickup truck pulling a horse trailer was involved in an accident.
The court held that the accident arose out of the use of the horse
trailer, since at the time of the accident the trailer was being used
to transport a horse. The court said that "arising out of" means
causally connected with, not proximately caused by, and but for
causation-a cause and result relationship-is enough to satisfy this
provision of the policy. Following this line of reasoning in National,
"but for" the transportation of the rifle the accident and subse-
quent injury would not have occurred.
15 214 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1954). Cf. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 154 So. 2d 226 (La. Ct. App. 1963) where an insured returned to
her home and parked her automobile on an inclined driveway. Ap-
proximately an hour later she observed that the automobile, occupied
by one of her minor children had begun to roll down the incline. In
an attempt to stop the automobile the insured was struck and killed.
The court held that the injury did not arise out of the use of the auto-
mobile because neither the insurer nor the insured intended to contract
with respect to liability resulting from the use of the vehicle by a
child; Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Hall, 246 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.S.C.
1965) where an insured drove his car in front of an automobile being
driven by the plaintiff, blocking his path. Insured then alighted from
the car and subjected the plaintiff to a brutal assault. The court held
that the injury did not arise out of the use of the vehicle since this
was not the type of use reasonably contemplated by the insurer and
the insured; Handley v. Oakley, 10 Wash.2d 396, 116 P.2d 833 (1941)
where an ice cream truck parked near a baseball diamond for the pur-
pose of distributing ice cream to children. A minor was struck by a
foul ball while standing near the truck. The court held that the injury
did not arise out of the use of the vehicle since this type of injury
was not contemplated by the parties.
16 403 Pa. 603, 170 A.2d 571 (1961).
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E. CONSEQUENCE OF THE USE
In Dorsey v. Fidelity Union Cas. Co.,1'7 injury was inflicted on
the insured while seated at the steering wheel of an automobile by
the accidental discharge of a rifle from which a companion was re-
moving shells for the purpose of loading the rifle into the automo-
bile. The companion was standing outside the automobile. The
court in construing the words "as a result of" held that the injury
resulted from operating or riding in the car:
[T]he parties had gone to the country for the purpose of hunting
ducks, and intended to return to the city. The automobile was
being used as a mode of conveyance, and Dorsey was the operator
thereof. It was contemplated that the car would be used not only
to convey the parties but their guns and ammunition. It was nec-
essary that the guns be loaded into the car if they were to be
transported to the city. Dorsey was in the car waiting for it to
be loaded and for the purpose of driving it to the city as soon as
the guns had been placed therein. The companion who fired the
gun was not a stranger to the transaction, and he did not appear
on the scene by accident. He and Dorsey were engaged in a com-
mon purpose with a common design, and were working in co-
operation with each other. The transportation of the guns was a
part of the common purpose.... Dorsey by riding in the car and
operating it for the purpose for which it was being used, to wit,
the hauling of the men and their guns, was thus brought into close
proximity to the gun and exposed to the danger of being injured
thereby while the guns were being prepared and loaded into the'
car. Such danger was necessarily incident to the use of the car for
the purpose for which it was then being used, and- the injury was
one of the consequences of such use.' s
It is submitted that the construction of the phrase "as a result of" is
sufficiently similar to the construction of the phrase "arising out of
the use of" to make the above mentioned language apply with
equal vigor to the case at bar.' 9
F. USE OF AN APPURTENANCE
In Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Lott,2 0 the named insured, while
17 52 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1932).
Is Id. at 776-77.
19 The verb "results" means "to proceed, spring or arise." Pacific Indem.
Co. v. Arline, 213 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1948).
20 273 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1960). -See Laviana v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 224
F. Supp. 563 (D. Vt. 1963) where the defendant was unloading his gun
outside of the car when the door swung shut causing the gun to 'dis-
charge injuring the plaintiff. The court said that the injury arose out
of the use of the car because a part of the car, namely the door, was
instrumental in producing the accident. See also Bolton v. North River
Ins. Co., 102 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1958) where a passenger in the
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resting his rifle across the top of his vehicle, shot at a deer. The
bullet was deflected by the top of the vehicle and injured a passen-
ger inside. The court held that the "automobile" was used as a
gun-rest and therefore the accident arose out of the use of the
"automobile." The court went on to say that the "automobile"
did not have to be used as a "vehicle," but any injury would arise
out of the use of the automobile if the automobile was being used
in some way. In Fidelity the automobile was being used as a gun-
rest. In the instant case the automobile was being used in its tradi-
tional method-as a mode of transportation. Accordingly, it would
seem that the National case is even stronger than the Fidelity case
because the automobile was being used as a "vehicle," a means of
transporting the guns, and the ensuing injury arose out of this use.
G. AUTOMOBILE AS AN INDISPENSABLE AGENT
In Wheeler v. London Guar. & Acc. Co.,21 the insured had trans-
ported two steel girders and by means of a block and tackle, with
the automobile engine as motive power, loaded them into a garage.
A boy stepped on one of the girders which caused it to roll over
crushing his foot. The court pointed out that the automobile was an
indispensable agent in the performance of the task and was directly
connected with it. Therefore the injury arose out of the use of the
automobile. In National it can also be said that the automobile
was an indispensable agent, for without it the youths could not
have gone hunting.
H. ESSENTIAL TRANSACTION IN CONNECTION WITH USE
In Owens v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp.,22 the plaintiff was in-
back seat of an automobile suddenly and without warning slammed the
back door of the automobile on the plaintiff's left hand. The court
held that the injury arose out of the use of the vehicle since an appur-
tenance of the vehicle produced the accident. But cf. McDonald v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 224 F. Supp. 369 (D.R.I. 1963) where a child threw a
cherry bomb out of his father's moving vehicle and into the plaintiff's
vehicle injuring a passenger. The court said that the injury did not
arise out of the use of the vehicle because the injury was not caused
by something physically attached to or immediately connected with the
vehicle. It should be noted that this Rhode Island rule of limiting
recovery only to injuries which are caused by the vehicle or something
physically attached to the vehicle is restrictive and in the minority.
21 292 Pa. 156, 140 Atl. 855 (1928).
22 194 Ark. 817, 109 S.W.2d 928 (1937). See Federated Mut. Implement &
Hardware Ins. Co. v. Gupton, 241 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.S.C. 1965) where
a service station employee was delivering gas to a stalled automobile.
As the employee poured the gas from a can into the tank, the woman
driving the car started it up and drove backward pinning the employee
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jured when she fell from an ambulance stretcher as she was being
carried to the ambulance. Since the use of the stretcher was an
essential transaction in connection with the use of the automobile
as an ambulance, the injury arose out of the use of the automobile.
Since in National the automobile was being used in its traditional
manner-as a means of conveyance-this type of case is inapplicable.
I. INDEPENDENT ACTS
In Norton v. Huisman,23 the plaintiff was injured while operat-
ing a sewer cleaning machine mounted on a truck. The court in
holding that the injury did not arise out of the use of the truck
stated that the injuries were the result of the independent opera-
tion of the sewer cleaning machine. It could be argued that the
rifle in the National case like the sewer machine in the Norton
case was an independent instrumentality. The truck was not nec-
essary to the operation of the sewer cleaning machine and the car
was not necessary to the operation of the rifle. However, in the
Norton case the truck was not being used at the time of the acci-
dent. In National the car was not only being used at the time of
the accident, but the use being made of the car was transporting
the instrumentality which gave rise to the accident. Accordingly it
cannot be said that firing of the rifle was a totally independent act,
completely disconnected from the use of the vehicle.
J. LOADING AND UNLOADING
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdez,24 the insured was ejecting shells
from his shotgun as a preparatory step to placing the shotgun in the
trunk of the car. The shotgun accidentally discharged inflicting
serious injuries to an occupant of the car. The court held that the
accident arose out of the use of the vehicle sirnce the shotgun dis-
charged as the defendant attempted to load the V¢ehicle. In National
between the car and his _mployer's truck. Since the bringing of the
gas was an essential transaction in connection'with the use of the truck
as a highway emergency vehicle, the injury arose out of the use of the
truck.
23 17 Wis.2d 296, 116 N.W.2d 169 (1962). See Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab.
Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 118 N.J. L. 317, 192 Atl. 387
(Sup. Ct. 1937) where plaintiff was injured when an employee of a
milk company, while delivering milk, negligently used an ice pick. The
court held that this was a totally independent act entirely disconnected
with the use of the vehicle.
24 190 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1961). See Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp.
v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. Am., 228 F. Supp. 896 (D. Md. 1964) where
the court states that a policy which contains the language "loading and
unloading" broadens the coverage afforded the insured.
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the gun discharged after the car had been loaded; therefore it can-
not be said that the injury arose out of the loading or unloading of
the car. However, the distinction between unloading the rifle be-
fore entering the car and unloading the gun after entering the car
provides little basis for the determination of insurance coverage.
III. CONCLUSION
The opinion in National recognizes that the concept of "arising
out of the use of" comprises many things. First, that an automobile
may be used by a person without it actually being driven by him.
Second, that the automobile does not have to be the proximate cause
of the injury, but some causal relation must exist between the
injury and the use of the vehicle. Third, that the words "arising
out of the use of" are broad, general and comprehensive. Fourth,
that the clause should be given a liberal construction in favor of
the insured. After recognizing and considering the many facets of
the "arising out of the use of" clause, the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska decided to apply the clause narrowly. A narrow application
of the clause in this case would seem unwarranted in the light of
two important factors. First, the insurer, when composing the pol-
icy, has the opportunity to define the clause as broadly or as nar-
rowly as he may desire. Since the insurer did not choose to re-
strict this clause, the broader application of other jurisdictions
should have been adopted in accordance with the recognized prin-
ciple of construing the clause in favor of -the insured. Second, it is
common knowledge that automobiles are frequently used to trans-
port men and guns on hunting trips. By failing to exclude fire-arm
accidents from the policy the insurer in effect acquiesced in the
transportation of the guns in the vehicle, and accepted the risk of
someone being injured.
It is difficult to escape the overriding policies of liberal con-
struction and effectuating the intention of the parties. The pri-
mary purpose of a party in buying insurance is indemnification,
and if at all possible, that purpose should be effectuated.
Steven G. Seglin '66
